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Abstract—Cooperative transmission in vehicular networks is
studied by using coalitional game and pricing in this paper.
There are several vehicles and roadside units (RSUs) in the
networks. Each vehicle has a desire to transmit with a certain
probability, which represents its data burtiness. The RSUs can
enhance the vehicles’ transmissions by cooperatively relaying
the vehicles’ data. We consider two kinds of cooperations:
cooperation among the vehicles and cooperation between the
vehicle and RSU. First, vehicles cooperate to avoid interfering
transmissions by scheduling the transmissions of the vehicles
in each coalition. Second, a RSU can join some coalition to
cooperate the transmissions of the vehicles in that coalition.
Moreover, due to the mobility of the vehicles, we introduce the
notion of encounter between the vehicle and RSU to indicate
the availability of the relay in space. To stimulate the RSU’s
cooperative relaying for the vehicles, the pricing mechanism is
applied. A non-transferable utility (NTU) game is developed to
analyze the behaviors of the vehicles and RSUs. The stability of
the formulated game is studied. Finally, we present and discuss
the numerical results for the 2-vehicle and 2-RSU scenario, and
the numerical results verify the theoretical analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular networks, from which drivers can obtain useful
messages such as traffic conditions and real-time information
on road to increase traffic safety and efficiency, has gained
much attention [1]. Meanwhile, vehicular networks can also
provide entertainment content for passengers and collect data
for road and traffic managers. In vehicular networks, vehi-
cles and roadside units (RSUs) can communicate with each
other through vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), roadside-to-vehicle
(R2V), vehicle-to-roadside (V2R) and roadside-to-roadside
(R2R) communications.
As an important modus operandi of substantially improving
coverage and communication efficiency in wireless networks,
cooperative transmission has gained considerable attention
recently. In cooperative communications, some neighboring
nodes can be used to relay the source signal to the des-
tination, hence forming a virtual antenna array to obtain
spatial diversity. Decode-and-forward (DF) is a commonly-
used cooperative protocol [2]. In DF relaying, the relay node
first decodes the received signal from the source, re-encodes
it, and then forwards it to the destination. For the purpose
of improving the system spectral efficiency, the cooperative
relaying with relay selection [3], [4] has been introduced on
one hand. On the other hand, the non-orthogonal relaying
protocols have been investigated [5].
Since the coalitional game theory provides analytical tools
to model the behaviors of rational players when they cooper-
ate, it is a powerful tool for designing robust, practical, effi-
cient, and fair cooperation strategies and has been extensively
applied in communication and wireless networks, which in-
cludes the vehicular networks [6]. In [7], the coalitional game
theory was utilized to investigate the cooperation between
rational wireless users, and the stability of the coalition was
analyzed. Cooperative transmission between boundary nodes
and backbone nodes was studied based on coalition games in
[8]. In [9], bandwidth sharing was studied by using coalition
formation games in V2R communications. In [10], the coali-
tion formation games for distributed cooperation among RSUs
in vehicular networks were studied. In [11], the coalitional
game theory was applied in studying how to stimulate message
forwarding in vehicular networks. The coalition formation
problem for rational nodes in a cooperative DF network was
formulated in [12]. The coalitional game theoretic approach
for secondary spectrum access in cooperative cognitive radio
networks was studied in [13]. The stability of cooperation
in multi-access systems was analyzed in [14]. In [15], the
coalitional game was utilized to study the cooperative packet
delivery in hybrid wireless networks. In cooperative relay
networks, there are costs (e.g., energy consumption, opera-
tional cost, bandwidth) at the relays for forwarding the other
users’ signals. Hence, a proper compensation mechanism is
indispensable to provide the relays with incentives to forward
the signals. Pricing mechanism was studied accordingly [16].
In this paper, we investigate the cooperative transmission
in vehicular networks under the framework of the coalitional
game theory and pricing mechanism. On one hand, the vehi-
cles can form coalitions to cooperatively schedule their trans-
missions. On the other hand, the RSUs can join the coalitions
to cooperate the transmission of the vehicles. In the considered
scenario, as the vehicles are dynamic with respect to the
RSUs, the vehicles and RSUs may be very far away. In this
case, the cooperative transmission may be unprofitable if not
impossible. Accordingly, we propose the notion of encounter
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Fig. 1. Cooperative transmission with coalitions in vehicular networks
between the vehicles and RSUs. Two conditions should be
satisfied before a RSU cooperates a vehicle’s transmission: 1)
the RSU and vehicle are in the same coalition; 2) the RSU and
vehicle encounter each other. When the two conditions hold,
the RSU can use cooperative transmission to help the vehicle.
In return, the vehicle should pay for the RSU. We consider
the problem as a non-transferable utility (NTU) game. The
stability of the existing coalition is studied. Numerical results
demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed game.
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section
II presents the system model. Next, the coalitional game
approach for the considered problem is proposed in Section
III. We first formulate a NTU game to model the cooperative
transmission in the considered vehicular network, and then
the analysis of the proposed coalitional game is carried out.
In Section IV, the numerical results are discussed. Finally, we
conclude the paper in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a wireless network in Fig. 1, which consists of
a network operator (NoP), K vehicles, and M RSUs.1 The
vehicles and RSUs can form coalitions and the RSUs can co-
operate the transmissions of the vehicles when they are in the
same coalition. Let 0 denote the NoP, and V = {1, 2, · · · ,K}
and R = {K + 1, 2, · · · ,K + M} represent the set of the
vehicles and RSUs, respectively.
We consider the uplink communications from the vehicle
to the NoP. Each i ∈ V has its transmission range di.2 When
RSU i ∈ R is in the transmission range of vehicles j ∈ V, we
call i encounters j. Vehicle i ∈ V is active in each time-slot
with probability pi, independently of other vehicles. When
two or more vehicles transmit simultaneously, it is called a
collision, and we suppose that the transmissions will fail when
a collision occurs. The cooperative protocol utilized in this
paper is the non-orthogonal decode-and-forward (NDF) [5].
In the first half of the time-slot, the source transmit to the
1The concept of relay node has been introduced in IEEE 802.16j for
WiMAX networks.
2It is assumed that within the transmission range, the correct decoding at
the receiver can be guaranteed.
relay and destination; In the second half, the relay decodes and
forwards the source message. Meanwhile, the source transmits
a new message to the destination.
We assume that vehicles in the same coalition can cooperate
to schedule the transmissions, and only one vehicle transmits
at a time to avoid interference. In each coalition, a scheduler
determines the active user that can transmit while other active
users remain silent. When vehicle j is scheduled to transmit at
a time-slot, it selects one RSU from the feasible RSU set (i.e.,
the set of RSUs that are in the same coalition with vehicle j
and encounter vehicle j) as relay to assist its transmission.3
Then one vehicle only employs at most one RSU as relay for
each transmission. Furthermore, as no more than one vehicle
is scheduled to transmit at a given time-slot, one RSU assists
the most one vehicles at a given time-slot. When the vehicle
j utilizes RSU i as relay for its transmission, RSU i charges
vehicle j with price ξij per transmission.
When some vehicles and RSUs form a coalition, the ve-
hicles would share the channel with each other in TDMA
mode, and they need to pay for the RSU’s relaying. However,
the vehicles can avoid collision and gain diversity as well as
rate increase. On the other hand, although there are costs in
receiving and forwarding the vehicles’ signals [17], the RSUs
could achieve revenues by charging the vehicles. In a word,
both vehicles and RSUs have incentives to form coalitions.
III. COALITIONAL GAME APPROACH
In this section, we first formulate the coalitional game in
Section III-A, and then we analyze the formulated game in
Section III-B.
A. Coalitional game formulation
A coalitional game G is uniquely defined by the pair (N , v),
where N is the set of players, any non-empty subset S ⊆ N
is called a coalition, and v is the coalition value, it quantifies
the worth of a coalition in a game.
In our paper, the players are the vehicles and RSUs, i.e.,
N = V∪R. S ⊆ N is a coalition. Define S∩V := Su and S∩
R := Sr. Consider a time-slot, let i↔ j denote i encounters
j during the whole time-slot and Pij = Pr {i↔ j}. The data
rate increase of vehicle i with the cooperation from the RSU
j is denoted as ∆ij . Formally, the scheduler in S is a map
fS : 2
S → S such that fS(Ψ) ∈ Ψ for all Ψ ⊆ S and
fS(Ψ) = ∅ iff Ψ = ∅.4
The average effective throughput for vehicle i can be
expressed as
Ti(S) = EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={i}
}
(1 + ζi(S))
∏
j∈V\Su
(1− pj) ,
where EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={i}
}
denotes the ratio of time-slots that
vehicle i is chosen to transmit. For example, we can assume
fS(Ψ) chooses the minimal element from the set of active
3We assume that the selection is performed according to a uniform
probability distribution for simplicity.
4Similar definitions can be found in [14].
vehicles Ψ. Let Su =
{
s1, · · · , s|Su|
}
with s1 > · · · > s|Su|,
then
EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={s|Su|}
}
= ps|Su| (1)
and
EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={sk}
}
= psk
|Su|∏
i=k+1
(1− psi), k = 1, · · · , |Su| − 1. (2)
ζi(S) is the average increase of data rate for vehicle i and it
is given by
ζi(S) =
∑
j∈Sr
∆ijPji
∏
k 6=j∈Sr
(1− Pki)
+
∑
j<k∈Sr
∆ij +∆ik
2
PjiPki
∏
l 6=j,l 6=k∈Sr
(1− Pli)
+
∑
j<k<l∈Sr
∆ij +∆ik +∆il
3
PjiPkiPli
×
∏
r 6=j,r 6=k,r 6=l∈Sr
(1− Pri) + · · ·+
∑
j∈Sr
∆ij
n
∏
j∈Sr
Pji,
where n = |Sr|. If Sr = ∅, i.e., n = 0, ζi(S) = 0.
Suppose ∆ij = ∆i, i.e., the data increase for vehicle i
is irrelevant to the selection of RSUs, then the average
throughput for vehicle i can be simplified as Ti(S) =
EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={i}
}
(1 + Pi∆i)
∏
j∈V\Su
(1− pj) , where Pi =
1 −
∏
j∈Sr
(1− Pji) is the probability that at least one RSU
in the coalition encounters vehicle i.
Remark: If there are active vehicles outside S at a given
time-slot, at least one vehicle outside S transmits simulta-
neously with the scheduled vehicles in S no matter how the
vehicles outside S form coalitions. Thus, there is no collision
if and only if (iff) all vehicles outside S is inactive.
For vehicle i, the average payment made to the RSUs can
be given by Pi(S) = EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={i}
}
χi(S) with
χi(S) =
∑
j∈Sr
ξjiPji
∏
k 6=j∈Sr
(1− Pki)
+
∑
j<k∈Sr
ξji + ξki
2
PjiPki
∏
l 6=j,l 6=k∈Sr
(1 − Pli)
+
∑
j<k<l∈Sr
ξji + ξki + ξli
3
PjiPkiPli
×
∏
r 6=j,r 6=k,r 6=l∈Sr
(1 − Pri) + · · ·+
∑
j∈Sr
ξji
n
∏
j∈Sr
Pji.
If n = 0, χi(S) = 0. Assume ξij = ξj , i.e., all the RSUs set
the same price for vehicle j, then the average payment can be
simplified as Pi(S) = EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={i}
}
Piξi.
Remark: The RSU charges the vehicles once the vehicles
employs the RSU as the relay for a transmission, it does not
take the collisions into account. That is to say, the actions in
other coalitions do not affect the charging.
The payoff of vehicle i is determined by ui(S) = αiTi(S)−
βiPi(S).
For RSU j in S, the revenue charged from the vehicles can
be given by
Rj(S) =
∑
i∈Su
EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={i}
}
ηij(S)ξji, (3)
where ηij(S) is the probability that vehicle i employs RSU j
as its relay for transmission, and it is given by
ηij(S) = Pji
[ ∏
k 6=j∈Sr
(1 − Pki)
+
1
2
∑
k 6=j∈Sr
Pki
∏
l 6=j,l 6=k∈Sr
(1− Pli)
+
1
3
∑
k<l,k 6=j,l 6=j∈Sr
PkiPli
∏
r 6=j,r 6=k,r 6=l∈Sr
(1− Pri)
+ · · ·+
1
n
∏
k 6=j∈Sr
Pki
]
. (4)
Assume that RSU j receives the signal of vehicle i at cost
crji and the cost of forwarding the signal to NoP as c
f
ji. The
average cost of RSU j can be expressed as
Cj(S) =
∑
i∈Su
EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={i}
} [
c
f
jiηij(S) + Pjic
r
ji
]
. (5)
Remark: RSU j receives the message of vehicle i once it
encounters vehicle i (with probability Pji), and it forwards
the message only when it is selected as the relay by vehicle i
(with probability ηij(S)).
The payoff of RSU j is determined by u˜j(S) = γjRj(S)−
µjCj(S). Define v(S) ⊆ R|Su|+|Sr| be the set of feasible
payoff vectors for S, we formulate the considered cooperation
problem as a coalitional NTU-game G : (V ∪ R, v).
B. Analysis of the formulated coalitional game
In this section, we first present two observations. Next, we
analyze the stability of the game and propose a sufficient
condition for the existence of the core.
In the beginning, we have the following observation.
Observation 1. Let f(S) =
∑
i∈Su
ui(S) +
∑
j∈Sr
u˜j(S) denote
the sum payoff of S. When γj = 1 and βi = 1, we have
f(S) =
∑
i∈Su
αiTi(S) −
∑
j∈Sr
µjCj(S). That is to say, the
pricing has no effect on the sum payoff in this case.
Proof: First we can prove that χi =
∑
j∈Sr
ηij(S)ξji. Then
EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={i}
}
χi
= EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={i}
} ∑
j∈Sr
ηij(S)ξji
(a)
=
∑
j∈Sr
EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={i}
}
ηij(S)ξji. (6)
(a) holds since EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={i}
}
is irrelevant to j ∈ Sr. Next,
based on (6), we can derive∑
i∈Su
EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={i}
}
χi
=
∑
i∈Su
∑
j∈Sr
EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={i}
}
ηij(S)ξji. (7)
Exchanging the summation order on the right side, we get∑
i∈Su
Pi(S) =
∑
j∈Sr
Rj(S). (8)
When γj = 1 and βi = 1, f(S) =
∑
i∈Su
αiTi(S) −∑
j∈Sr
µjCj(S)+
∑
i∈Su
Pi(S)−
∑
j∈Sr
Rj(S). Using (8), we derive
f(S) =
∑
i∈Su
αiTi(S)−
∑
j∈Sr
µjCj(S).
Remark: Observation 1 reveals the fact that the total rev-
enues obtained by the RSUs equal to the payments of all the
vehicles.
In addition, we obtain the second observation.
Observation 2. A coalition S should have at least one vehicle.
Otherwise, u˜i(S) = 0 = u˜i({i}) and v(S) =
∑
i∈S
u˜i(S) = 0.
That is to say, when there are only the RSUs, the RSUs have
no stimuli to form coalitions and each RSU will act alone.
Proof: When |Su| = 0, we get Rj(S) = 0 and Cj(S) =
0 according to (3) and (5), respectively. Thus, u˜i(S) = 0.
Specifically, u˜i({i}) = 0. As u˜i(S) = u˜i({i}) in this case,
each RSU will act alone.
Remark: The function of the RSU is relaying the vehicle’s
signal. So when there is no vehicle, it is meaningless to group
only the RSUs together.
On the other hand, when there is no RSU in a coalition
S, i.e., S ⊆ V, ui(S) = EΨ
{
1fS(Ψ)={i}
} ∏
j∈V\S
(1− pj) for
i ∈ S and v(S) =
∑
i∈S
ui(S) > 0. Specially when S = {i},
we derive ui({i}) = pi
∏
j∈V\{i}
(1− pj). Hence, when ∃S ⊆
V & S ∋ i satisfying ui(S) > ui({i}), the vehicles will
form coalitions to improve the utility. Specifically, let S =
{s1, · · · , s|S|} with s1 > · · · > s|S|, based on (1) and (2), we
can derive that if
1 ≥


∏
j∈S\{si}
(1− pj) , i = |S|;
∏
j∈S\{si}
(1−pj)
|S|∏
k=i+1
(1−psk)
, otherwise,
(9)
forming coalition S is profitable.5 Specially, when pi = p, i.e.,
all vehicles have the same active probability, we can derive that
(9) holds, then forming coalitions is always profitable in the
case.
5Although forming S may be not optimal, it is at least better than acting
alone.
Next, as the core is one of the most important stability
concepts defined for coalitional games, we investigate the core
of our proposed coalitional game in the following.
The definition for the core of our coalitional game is given
as follows.
Defination 1. The core of (V∪R, v) is defined as C =
{
x ∈
v (V ∪R) : ∀S, 6 ∃y ∈ v(S), s.t. yi > xi, ∀i ∈ S
}
.
The following observation gives a sufficient condition for
the existence of the core.
Observation 3. The core of (V∪R, v) is nonempty once the
following conditions hold (S ⊂ V ∪ R):
1) αi > 0, βi > 0, γj > 0, and µj > 0.
2) αiTi(S) > βiPi(S) or γjRj(S) > µjCj(S).
3) αiTi(V ∪ R) − βiPi(V ∪ R) > αiTi(S) − βiPi(S), and
γjRj(V ∪ R)− µjCj(V ∪R) > γjRj(S)− µjCj(S).
Proof: When 1) holds, we can find αi, βi, γi, and
µj to satisfy 2). If 2) does not holds, we have ui({i}) =∏
j∈V/{i}
(1− pj) ≥ 0 ≥ ui(S) for i ∈ Su and u˜j(S) ≤ 0 =
u˜j({j}) for j ∈ Sr. Then, each vehicle and RSU will act
alone. In this case, the core is empty. When 3) holds, we
can prove that (V ∪ R, v) is balanced [18]. Thus, the core is
nonempty according to the Bondareva-Shapley theorem [19].
Remark: The core is possibly non-empty in practice. For
example, when the considered vehicles wait for the traffic light,
the vehicles as well as the nearby RSUs are probable to form
the coalition together.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we demonstrate the numerical evaluations
for the performance of the cooperative transmission scheme
with coalitions. In the simulations, we assume that the nodes
are uniformly located in a square area of 1km × 1km.6 The
network topology changes at the beginning of each time-
slot and remains static during the whole time-slot. That is
to say, the locations of the nodes are generated according
to the uniform distribution at the beginning of a time-slot,
the locations do not change during the time-slot, and we re-
generate the locations at the beginning of the next time-slot.
We consider the scenario that there are 2 vehicles (vehicle 1
and vehicle 2) and 2 RSUs (RSU 3 and RSU 4) in the area.
Fig. 2 shows the encounter probability with different trans-
mission ranges for vehicle 1 and vehicle 2. In the simulations,
we set d1 = d2 = d and the probability is obtained from 106
time-slots. We can observe that RSU 3 & vehicle 1, RSU 4
& vehicle 1, RSU 3 & vehicle 2, and RSU 4 & vehicle 2
have similar encounter probabilities. It is because that since
all nodes are uniformly distributed, vehicle 1 and vehicle 2 as
well as RSU 3 and RSU 4 are exchangeable in location. In
addition, we can see that the encounter probability increases
with the increase of the transmission range. In the evaluations
6The area has been divided to 10× 10.
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Fig. 2. Encounter probability with different transmission ranges
TABLE I
POSSIBLE COALITIONAL STRUCTURE
C1: {1,2,3,4} C6: {1,3},{2,4} C11: {1,2},{3,4}
C2: {1,3,4},{2} C7: {1,2,3},{4} C12: {1},{2},{3,4}
C3: {1,2},{3},{4} C8: {1},{2,3,4} C13: {1,2,4},{3}
C4: {1},{2},{3},{4} C9: {1,4},{2,3} C14: {1,4},{2},{3}
C5: {1},{3},{2,4} C10: {1},{4},{2,3} C15: {2},{4},{1,3}
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Fig. 3. Utility performance in C1
of utility performance, we set ∆ij = 0.5, pi = 0.6, ξij = 1.5,
c
f
ji = 0.5, c
r
ji = 0.2, αi = 10, βi = 1, and γj = µj = 1. There
are totally 15 coalitional structures for 2 vehicles and 2 RSUs
as illustrated in Table I. Using Observation 2, we need not
considering C11 and C12. Meanwhile, as vehicle 1 and vehicle
2 as well as RSU 3 and RSU 4 are exchangeable,7 we only
need to consider C1 - C7.8
Fig. 3 plots the utility performance for 4 nodes when
they form the coalition together(C1). The utility performance
increases when we increase the transmission range. The
reason is that the encounter probability will increase when
the transmission range increases (see Fig. 2). Consequently,
7vehicle 1 and vehicle 2 are not exchangeable because of the scheduling
when they are in the same coalition. However, as exchanging elements in the
same coalition is meaningless, it does not affect the analysis here.
8C8 is similar as C2; C9 is similar as C6; C10 , C14 and C15 are similar as
C5; and C13 is similar as C7.
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Fig. 4. Utility performance in C2 and C3
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Fig. 5. Utility performance in C4 and C5
the probability of cooperative transmission will increase. As
cooperative transmission could benefit both the vehicle and
RSU,9 the utility performance increases. Another observation
is that the utility performance for vehicle 1 is better than that
of vehicle 2, and the utility performance for RSU 3 and RSU
4 is similar. This can be explained as follows: when vehicle
1 and vehicle 2 are in the same coalition and both of them
are active, the scheduler selects vehicle 1 to transmit, i.e.,
the vehicle 1 has higher transmission priory than vehicle 2.
Consequently, the utility performance for vehicle 1 is better.
In contrast, RSU 3 and RSU 4 have same priority in the relay
selection of vehicle and they have same encounter probability
with vehicle 1 (or vehicle 2), the same relaying price, and the
same cost for receiving and forwarding, so they have similar
utility performance.
Fig. 4(a) - Fig. 6(a) illustrate the utility performance for
C2 - C7, respectively. As compared with Fig. 3, the utility
performance of vehicle 1 evidently decreases, and the util-
ity performance of vehicle 2, RSU 3, and RSU 4 slightly
decreases in Fig. 4(a). Based on the scheduling scheme, the
successful transmission probability of RSU 1 is p1 = 0.6 in
C1. In contrast, it is p1× (1−p2) = 0.24 in C2. That is to say,
the successful transmission probability obviously decreases.
Thus, the utility decreases evidently. With respect to vehicle
2, the successful transmission probabilities are the same in
C1 and C2 (i.e., (1− p1)× p2 = 0.24). However, there are no
RSUs that are in the same coalition with vehicle 2 in C2. Then
no cooperative transmission can be implemented for vehicle
9Under the simulation settings, cooperative transmission is preferable for
both vehicle and RSU.
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Fig. 6. Utility performance in C6 and C7
2, and the utility performance decreases accordingly. In C1,
both vehicle 1 and vehicle 2 may utilize RSU 3 (or RSU 4)
for cooperative transmission. In contrast, only vehicle 1 may
utilize RSU 3 (or RSU 4) in C2, i.e., the probability of being
utilized as a relay will decrease in C2. As being utilized as a
relay is profitable in our settings, the utility performance of
RSU 3 (RSU 4) decreases.
Comparing Fig. 4(b) with Fig. 5(a), it can be observed that
the utility performance of vehicle 1 is much better in Fig. 4(b),
and the utility performances of the other three nodes (vehicle
2, RSU 3, and RSU 4) are the same. It can be explained by
using (9). Firstly, S = {2, 1} with s1 = 2 and s2 = 1. Then
we have

∏
j∈S\{si}
(1− pj) = 1− p2 = 0.4 < 1, i = 2;
∏
j∈S\{si}
(1− pj)
[
|S|∏
k=i+1
(1− psk)
]−1
= (1 − p1)[1− p1]−1 = 1, i = 1.
(10)
That is to say, the utility of RSU s2 = 1 will increase and the
utility of RSU s1 = 2 will remain the same when they form
the coalition {2, 1}.
Finally, we can see that the utility performance in C1
is better than other coalitional structures and the utility is
positive in all coalitional structures. Meanwhile, αi = 10 > 0,
βi = 1 > 0, and γj = µj = 1 > 0. Thus, the conditions in
Observation 3 hold. Applying Observation 3, we claim that the
core of the coalitional game is nonempty under the simulation
settings. Furthermore, (u1(C1), u2(C1), u3(C1), u4(C1)) is in
the core.
V. CONCLUSION
Cooperation among vehicles and cooperation between ve-
hicle and RSU in vehicular networks have been studied. We
propose the notion of encounter to characterize the relative
location between the vehicle and RSU when the vehicle is
locomotive. Utilizing the coalitional game theory and pricing
mechanism, we have formulated a NTU coalitional game to
analyze the behaviors of the vehicles and RSUs. Moreover, the
stability of the proposed game is studied. A sufficient condition
for the non-empty of the core is obtained. Numerical results
for the 2-vehicle and 2-RSU scenario verify the theoretical
analysis.
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